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Abstract 
Using data from the urban household surveys of the China Household Income Project for the 
years 1995, 2002, 2007 and 2013, we provide consistent estimates of the gender wage gap in 
urban China and investigate those factors that have contributed to this gap.  Similar to past 
studies, we find a substantial and progressive widening of the gap from 1995 to 2007.  Based on 
new data for 2013, however, we find that from 2007 to 2013 the gender wage gap narrowed.  For 
2013 we estimate the gender wage gap at between 19 percent and 25 percent.  Oaxaca-Blinder 
decompositions reveal that the contributions of the differences in characteristics between women 
and men to the wage gap declined over time, and by 2013 the gap is largely unexplained.  We 
identify key factors underlying the gender wage gap in recent years, specifically, individual 
characteristics, such as age, education, marriage, and children, as well as employment sector and 
occupation.   
 
Keywords: China, urban, inequality, gender, wage gap 
JEL Classification: J16, J31, O15, P23   
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I.  Introduction 
 
Past studies of the gender wage gap in urban China have found that since the 1980s the gap 
between female and male wage earnings has progressively widened.  This widening gender wage 
gap is not entirely surprising, as during this period China was undergoing the transition from a 
planned economy with an egalitarian wage structure to a predominately market-driven system 
with considerable wage differentiation.  Using new data from 2013 China Household Income 
Project (CHIP) survey, we find a reversal in this trend.  As measured by the ratio between mean 
female and mean male wages, the gender wage gap declined from 29 percent in 2007 to 25 
percent in 2013.  After controlling for age, education, marital status, ownership of work unit, 
occupation, production sector, and other characteristics, we find that the size of the gap is smaller 
and the decline persists.  Although the extent of the decline in the gender wage gap is modest, it 
represents a change from the past and hints at possible future trends in the gender wage 
differential.   
 In theory, systematic differences in wage earnings, such as those observed in urban 
China, should reflect differences in labor productivity.  Productivity is related to individual 
characteristics, such as education, experience, and age.  Productivity can also vary across 
regions, types of employers, sectors, and jobs or occupation.  Life events such as marriage, 
children and aging may have different effects on the perceived and actual productivity of women 
and men.  Parental leave and retirement policies, which differ between female and male 
employees, influence the costs to employers.  Consequently, life events can affect expectations, 
behavior, and productivity in ways that are likely to influence the gender wage gap.   
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 Empirical studies of the gender wage gap typically find that controlling for such 
productivity-related characteristics reduces, but does not eliminate, the gender wage gap.  The 
gender gap that remains after controlling for such characteristics is “unexplained” and is often 
attributed to discrimination.  Discrimination can occur in the form of preferential hiring of men 
over women, and higher starting salaries, promotions and wage increases for men than women 
over time.  The unexplained portion of the gender wage gap may also be due to factors other than 
discrimination that are not captured in an empirical analysis.  In addition, questions exist about 
why women and men differ in their observed characteristics.      
 In this chapter, we document and discuss long-term trends in the urban gender wage gap 
in China from 1995 through 2013, with a focus on the most recent years when the gap narrowed.  
For reasons of comparability over time and consistency with the literature, we restrict our 
analysis to formal urban residents.  Using data from the CHIP urban household surveys for the 
years 1995, 2002, 2007 and 2013, we estimate the size of the gender wage gap with and without 
controls for observable characteristics such as age, education, marital status, and sector.  We find 
that controlling for observable characteristics reduces but does not eliminate the gender wage 
gap.  A Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition identifies the extent to which the gap is explained by 
differences in the characteristics of women and men versus unexplained.  The results show that 
by 2013 the gap was largely unexplained, reflecting that the characteristics of urban women have 
converged with those of urban men over time.   
 Wage regressions provide some insights into the recent narrowing of the gender wage 
gap.  The estimates for 2007 reveal a larger gender wage gap between women and men with 
lower levels of education.  In 2007 the gap was also larger between married women and married 
men (with and without children) than it was for those who were unmarried.  Estimates for 2013 
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indicate that the narrowing of the overall gender wage gap from 2007 to 2013 was driven by 
improvements for particular subgroups.  Specifically, the gender wage gaps narrowed for young, 
less-educated, and married workers.        
 Our work builds on a large literature on the gender wage gap in urban China (recent 
studies include Li and Song 2013; Liu 2011; Xiu and Gunderson 2013).  We contribute to this 
literature in several ways.  First, we provide in one place a set of consistent estimates of the 
gender wage gap from 1995 through 2013, therefore providing a long-term perspective.  Second, 
using the CHIP 2013 data we update the literature and identify the recent narrowing of the gap.  
Third, we provide new evidence on factors underlying the changes in the gender wage gap, 
including life events such as marriage and children, that have been the subject of interesting 
recent research (Jia and Dong 2013; Qi and Dong 2016; Zhang and Hannum 2015).  
 Although differences in labor force participation are not the focus of this chapter, we 
recognize that the gender wage gap cannot be entirely disentangled from the question of who 
chooses to work (see Chi and Li 2014 for a discussion in the Chinese context).   To some extent, 
we sidestep this selection problem by restricting our estimation sample to workers between the 
ages of 25 and 49, thus removing those younger and older individuals who are choosing when to 
enter and when to leave the labor force.  Nevertheless, we present some background statistics on 
female and male labor force participation for a broader age range (ages 16 to 60).  During the 
prime working age range from 25 to 49, which is the focus of our gender wage gap analysis, 
labor force participation is high for both women and men, although it is higher for men.  More 
in-depth discussion of labor force participation using the CHIP data from 2013 and earlier years 
is provided by Xu and Li (2016), and additional analysis is available elsewhere in the literature 
(e.g., Hare 2016).  
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 The wages of women and men are, of course, related to broad shifts in China’s urban 
labor market and to changes in government policies.  We therefore begin with an overview of 
recent developments in urban China’s labor market and discuss some major policy measures 
relevant to gender wage differences.  In Section III we introduce the data, present the descriptive 
statistics, and discuss the broad patterns of employment and the raw gender wage gap.   Section 
IV explains our empirical methods.  Sections V and VI report on our findings from the wage 
regressions and the Oaxaca decompositions.  We conclude in Section VII with a discussion of 
our key findings and their implications. 
 
II.  Background:  Developments in China’s Urban Labor Market and Relevant Policies 
A.  Developments in China’s Urban Labor Market 
During the Maoist era and continuing through the 1980s, the allocation of labor in urban China 
was governed by planning and wages were set administratively.  The major urban employers 
were state- or collectively owned units, and the urban economy was heavily based in 
manufacturing.  China’s economic reforms brought changes to the allocation of labor and to the 
setting of wages as well as producing major shifts in the structure of the urban economy.  By the 
2000s markets had replaced planning, the state and collective sectors had declined, and the non-
state and foreign-owned sectors had emerged as major employers.  Concurrently, the structure of 
the economy shifted from manufacturing to services, causing a shift in the composition of urban 
employment.   
 Under the planned economy the gender wage gap was relatively small.  Liberalization of 
the setting of wages and the hiring of personnel led to the emergence of wage differentials, 
including those between men and women.  Structural shifts in the economy also influenced the 
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gender wage gap.  For example, the gender wage differential is smaller in the state sector than in 
other ownership sectors, so the declining share of employment in the state sector contributed to 
the widening of the average gender wage differential.     
 A significant change in recent years, especially since 2000, has been rural-urban 
migration.  The entry of large numbers of relatively unskilled rural workers into the urban labor 
markets is thought to have widened the gap in pay between unskilled and skilled laborers.  
Higher proportions of women than men in urban China work in unskilled jobs.  Increased 
competition from migrants for these unskilled jobs may therefore have influenced the gender 
wage gap.   
 Another notable development has been the dramatic expansion of higher education in 
China.  The number of new graduates from regular institutions of higher education rose from 
850,000 in 1999 to 4.5 million in 2007 and further to 6.4 million in 2013.1  Women, who 
historically were less likely to continue on to post-secondary education, have benefited 
disproportionately from this expansion of education.  Education among urban women has been 
catching up with that of urban men, with positive implications for their relative earnings.   
 During the global financial crisis, overall economic growth in China slowed down.  The 
economy weathered the crisis well, in part due to a large stimulus package, but it is possible that 
the crisis had an impact on the urban gender wage gap.  Our data are for one year before (2007) 
and one year after (2013) the peak years of the crisis.  By 2013 China’s economic recovery was 
well underway.  Compared with 2007, in 2013 national GDP had increased 68 percent and urban 
                                                          
1 National Bureau of Statistics data available in Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2015 (China Statistical 
Yearbook 2015), Table 21-9. http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2015/indexeh.htm.  Accessed August 9, 
2016.  
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employment had increased 24 percent.2  We therefore consider our findings to be indications of 
long-term trends rather than of the short-term effects of the crisis.     
 
B.   Policies 
In this section, we discuss selected recent policies relevant to the urban gender wage gap, 
specifically, minimum wage, parental leave, and retirement policies.  Minimum wages can 
increase the wages of low-paid workers and may also have spillover effects for workers higher 
up on the pay scale.  Since women are disproportionately represented in the lower rungs of the 
wage distribution, minimum wage policies potentially can reduce the gender wage gap.  Using 
Chinese data, Li and Ma (2015) find such an effect for low-income workers during the period 
from 2002 to 2009. 
 China’s minimum wage regulations were introduced in 1993.  However, during the early 
years implementation was uneven and minimum wage levels remained low.  In 2004 China 
strengthened its minimum wage regulations and expanded coverage to include more sectors and 
categories of workers.  Local governments continued to set minimum wages, but local minimum 
wages were regularly reviewed by higher levels of government and enforcement was 
strengthened.  The 2008 Labor Contract Law included a section on minimum wage policies, 
which further strengthened minimum wage policy and became part of formal legislation.3  The 
period from 2007 to 2013 saw substantial increases in minimum wage levels.  Overall, from 
2007 to 2013 the national average monthly minimum wage rose 88.3 percent, outpacing the 76.9 
percent increase in the national average monthly wage (Ye, Li, and Gindling 2015; Appendix 
                                                          
2 GDP growth is in constant prices.  Urban employment is for registered urban work units.  National 
Bureau of Statistics data from Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2014 (China Statistical Yearbook 2014), Tables 
3-5 and 4-2, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2015/indexeh.htm.  Accessed Jan. 15, 2017. 
3 For a fuller discussion of minimum wage policies in China, see Ye, Li, and Gindling (2016).  
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Table A12.2).  It is possible that these minimum wage increases contributed to the recent 
narrowing of the gender wage gap, especially among low-wage workers. 
   Child care and parental leave can influence women’s labor force participation and 
wages.  A recent study by Du and Dong (2013) reports that the decline in urban female labor 
force participation in China in the late 1990s and the early 2000s was associated with the loss of 
affordable, convenient child care accompanying the restructuring of public-sector enterprises.  
Du and Dong also find that the presence of day care in the community and the cost of child care 
affect urban women’s labor participation and work hours.  
 Parental-leave legislation tends to increase women’s labor force participation, but it is 
associated with lower relative wages for women (e.g., Ruhm 1998).  China’s parental-leave 
policies have evolved in recent years as provisions have become more generous and coverage 
has widened to cover more workers in more sectors.  National policy allows fathers one week of 
parental leave with compensation.  It also includes provisions for mothers’ extended maternity 
leave with compensation as well as coverage for medical expenses.  In the past, employers 
shouldered most of the costs associated with parental leave, thus creating negative incentives.  In 
recent years, however, the government has reduced the burden on employers by establishing and 
expanding a maternity insurance program that pays many of the costs associated with the 
national parental-leave regulations.  Maternity insurance is funded by mandatory employer 
contributions equal to a small percentage of the wage bill.   
 Two recent national policies affecting parental leave are the Social Insurance Law (2011) 
and the Special Provisions on Labor Protection for Female Employees (2012).  Together these 
policies specify national standards for parental leave, including the length of maternity leave, 
which was extended from 90 to 98 days in 2011, compensation levels during maternity leave, 
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and employer contributions to maternity insurance.  The Special Provisions also reinforce 
employment protection for women who become pregnant and take maternity leave.  Note that 
local governments have introduced additional regulations and policies, so that benefits vary 
regionally. 
 In recent years the number of people covered by maternity insurance has grown 
substantially.  From 2007 to 2013 coverage grew from 78 million employees to 164 million 
employees; as a share of employees in urban work units, coverage rose from 65 percent to 91 
percent (NBS Department of Population and Employment Statistics 2014: 11, 390‒393).  The 
number of beneficiaries has also increased but remains relatively low, at 1.1 million in 2007 and 
5.2 million in 2013 (NBS Department of Population and Employment Statistics 2014: 390-93).  
The small number of beneficiaries, which has been noted in several reports, is attributed to 
ongoing problems and uneven policy implementation (see, for example, China Labour Bulletin 
2016; Lin 2011; Liu and Sun 2015).  Reportedly, employers have been slow to join the maternity 
insurance program and to register all eligible employees.  Employers have also been reluctant to 
hire young women who do not yet have children because of the “high risk” that they will become 
pregnant and take maternity leave.  Moreover, when female employees become pregnant, 
employers have been known to try to “persuade” them, through semi-coercive measures, to 
resign.  Such practices can affect the employment and wage earnings of women through the life 
cycle. 
  Since the 1950s the statutory retirement age has remained at age 60 for men, age 55 for 
women who are civil servants and employees of the state sector, and age 50 for all other women.  
In recent years the government has considered changing the statutory retirement age, and in 2016 
it announced its intention to gradually increase the retirement age, with the specifics to be 
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announced in the future.  Some reports hint that the plan may include reducing the difference in 
retirement ages for women and men.      
 Regardless of possible future changes in the retirement age, for the period under analysis 
the retirement age for women has remained five to ten years earlier than that for men.  Women’s 
earlier retirement age has implications for the gender wage gap.  For both women and men, the 
age-earnings profile tends to flatten among older workers as they approach retirement age.  
Wages tend to increase with age from entrance into the labor market through middle age, when 
they reach a peak, and then flatten or even decline for workers who are closer to retirement.  As 
will be seen from the CHIP data, this is the case in urban China.  Moreover, the age-earnings 
profile flattens at an earlier age for women than it does for men, a reflection of the earlier 
retirement age, thus creating a widening of the gender wage gap among older workers.   
  
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
A.  Data 
For our analysis, we use data from the CHIP 1995, 2002, 2007 and 2013 urban household 
surveys.  To obtain consistent samples over time, we restrict the sample to the twelve provinces 
that are present in all four waves of the survey.  In all cases, the sample provinces cover the 
eastern, central and western regions of China.4  Except where noted otherwise, we employ two-
level province times region (eastern/center/western) population weights in all calculations and 
regressions so that the estimates are nationally representative.   
                                                          
4The twelve provinces common to all four waves of the survey are Guangdong, Beijing, Shanxi, 
Liaoning, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Chongqing, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Gansu.  Note that in 1995 
Chongqing was part of Sichuan province (and thus was included in the Sichuan sample of the CHIP 
survey for that year).     
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 Due to labor market segmentation between formal urban residents and rural-urban 
migrants as well as the non-comparability of some data between these two groups, we do not 
incorporate migrant households in our analysis.  In other words, the sample is confined to formal 
urban residents, i.e., individuals with an urban household registration (hukou).  For the 
descriptive analysis of labor force participation our sample includes individuals between the ages 
of 16 and 59.  For analysis of the wage gap, including the wage regressions and the Oaxaca 
decompositions, we restrict the sample to individuals at wage employment ages, that is between 
ages 25 and 49 inclusive.  We use the narrower age range for analysis of the wage gap to reduce 
the impact on our wage estimates of selection due to choices regarding labor market 
participation, which are mostly concentrated among the young who are choosing when to 
transition from school to work and among older workers who are choosing when to retire. 
 The wage data in the CHIP datasets were collected by the National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS) for its household survey and then provided to the CHIP.  In 2013 the NBS changed its 
definition of wage earnings.  Consequently, the wage data for 2013 are not entirely comparable 
to those in earlier years.  The new definition adds several new components of wages that were 
not included previously (see Table 12.1).  Using available information in the 2013 data on the 
components of wages, we have adjusted the NBS 2013 wage data to be as consistent as possible 
with the 2007 NBS wage definition.  A full correction is not possible due to a lack of information 
on some components of employer-paid contributions to benefits and social insurance.   In our 
judgment, the remaining inconsistencies are minor and unlikely to significantly affect our 
findings. 
[Table 12.1 about here] 
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B.  Descriptive Statistics:  Labor Force Participation and Employment 
Table 12.2 summarizes information in the 1995, 2002, 2007 and 2013 CHIP surveys about the 
employment status of working-age adults (ages 16‒59).  In all years, most working-age adults 
worked; however, work participation rates were consistently lower for women than for men.   
Work participation was highest in 1995, at 85 percent for men and 75 percent for women, but in 
2002 it dropped to 76 percent for men and 59 percent for women, a reflection of the enterprise 
restructuring and layoffs that took place in the late 1990s.  By 2007 work participation rates for 
men had recovered and remained stable through 2013 at about 80. However, work participation 
rates for women never fully recovered, leading to the emergence of a gender gap in work 
participation.  In 2007 and 2013 women’s work participation rates were 62‒63 percent, only 
modestly higher than those in 2002.     
[Table 12.2 about here] 
 This persistent gender gap in work participation since 2002 consists largely of a gender 
gap in wage employment.  In 1995 wage employment participation was 10 percentage points 
higher for men than for women.  The gap widened to about 15 percentage points in 2002 and 
thereafter remained at this level through 2013.   
 Aside from wage employment, the largest gender differences in Table 12.2 are in the 
categories of retirement, home maker, and “other.”  Women are disproportionately represented in 
these three categories.  In all years only 4 to 7 percent of men belonged to these three categories, 
as compared to 15 percent of women in 1995 and rising to more than 20 percent in later years.   
 Interestingly, although the share of women in these three categories combined was 
virtually identical in 2007 and 2013, the allocation of women among the three categories 
changed markedly.  The proportion of women who reported being retired declined from 17 
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percent in 2007 to 11 percent in 2013, whereas those who reported being home makers rose from 
4 percent to 9 percent, and those belonging to the “other” category rose from 1 percent to 4 
percent.  These shifts may reflect changing attitudes about these categories that affected the self-
reporting in the survey.  Individuals often fall into more than one of these categories, e.g., a 
retired person may also be a home maker.  We speculate that over time retired women became 
more willing to identify themselves as home makers or as “other”; therefore, we consider the 
three categories together as a single group.           
   Figure 12.1 shows the shares of women and men with wage employment by age for the 
most recent two years of the CHIP data.  For both women and men, wage job participation is low 
for the youngest age group but it increases rapidly, reaching over 75 percent for women and over 
80 percent for men by the age of 25.  After age 25 wage employment participation remains stable 
for women until their late 40s and for men until about age 50, after which it declines.   Our 
choice of ages 25 through 49 as the age cut-offs for the gender wage gap analysis is based on this 
age-employment pattern.   
[Figure 12.1 about here] 
 Comparing 2007 to 2013, we find that the gender gap in job participation rates remained 
stable for ages 16 through 35.  For those between the ages of 35 and 49 the gender gap widened 
somewhat due to a decline in female job participation.  For older ages, the gap in wage job 
participation narrowed slightly as men hastened and women delayed their departure from the 
wage labor force. 
 
C.  Descriptive Statistics:  Characteristics of Female and Male Wage Employment 
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Table 12.3 provides descriptive statistics on wage employment for the restricted estimation 
sample of individuals between the ages 25 and 49.  Here we note several patterns of interest.  
First, for both genders the age structure of wage workers shifted somewhat over time.  In 1995 
the dominant age groups were 35‒39 and 40‒44, with relatively few younger and older workers.  
By 2013 the age distributions had evened out, with some increases in the shares of younger (ages 
25‒29) and older (ages 45‒49) workers.  These shifts in age patterns reflect the combined effects 
of changes over time in the demographics of the urban population and in work participation by 
different age groups. 
[Table 12.3 about here] 
 Second, the composition of the sample with respect to marital status also changed over 
time.  The share of singles for both women and men increased and the share of married women 
and married men declined.  Also, over time the differences in marital status between women and 
men narrowed.  In 1995 a larger proportion of men than of women were single and a higher 
proportion of women than of men were married; by 2013 these proportions were basically the 
same for both women and men.  Note that the proportion reporting an “other” marital status, 
which includes divorced or widowed, increased slightly but remained very small.    
 Third, education levels rose for both women and men.  In 2013 more than 40 percent of 
both women and men had a post-secondary education, and less than 5 percent had only a primary 
education or less.   Over time, the share of individuals with college educations or higher rose and 
those with less education—junior high school and below—fell.  From 2007 to 2013 the share of 
women with a college education or above increased markedly so that by 2013 the share of 
women with a post-secondary education was almost the same as that for men.  
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 Changes in the employment structure in the sample are consistent with the structural 
changes in the labor market.  The share of individuals working in public and state-owned work 
units declined markedly, whereas the share working in private, joint-venture, and foreign-owned 
units increased.  Similarly, the structure of employment by occupation shifted away from manual 
work toward commerce and services.   With respect to production sectors, there was a substantial 
shift from the secondary sector to the tertiary sector.   
 Table 12.3 reveals some changes over time in the characteristics of gender differences.  
In 1995 the sectoral pattern of employment for women and men was similar, but in 2013 gender 
differences in the production sector of employment were substantial; in particular, in 2013 a 
much higher proportion of women than men were employed in the tertiary sector and a much 
lower proportion of women was employed in the secondary sector. With respect to most other 
characteristics, however, differences between men and women narrowed between 1995 and 
2013.  Notably, between 1995 and 2007 the education levels of women converged with those of 
men.  Additionally, in 2013 the ownership of work units for women and men was more similar 
than it was in earlier years.  As will be discussed below, the convergence of women’s and men’s 
characteristics over time has contributed to the trends in the gender wage gap.    
 
D.  Descriptive Statistics:  The Raw Gender Wage Ratio 
The gender wage ratio, calculated as the average female wage divided by the average male wage, 
provides a raw measure of the gender wage gap.  This measure is “raw” in the sense that it is not 
adjusted for differences in the characteristics of women and men.  A gender wage ratio of 100 
percent indicates no gender wage gap; a ratio below 100 percent indicates that on average 
women earn less than men.   
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 Table 12.4 shows the overall raw gender wage ratio and the raw gender wage ratio by 
subgroups.  The overall ratio declined progressively from 87 percent in 1995 to 82 percent in 
2002, and then further to 71 percent in 2007.  Between 2007 and 2013 the downward trend was 
reversed and the gender wage ratio increased to 75 percent.      
[Table 12.4 about here] 
 The gender wage ratio varies by age and education.  Figures 12.2 and 12.3 show the 
ratios by age and education subgroups, respectively.  With respect to age, in all years the wage 
ratio was higher for young workers and lower for older subgroups (Figure 12.2).  Moreover, 
from 1995 to 2007 the gender wage ratio declined for all age groups, but especially for older 
workers.  Notably, from 2007 to 2013 the gender wage ratio improved for middle-aged and older 
workers, but it changed little for younger age groups.  As age is correlated with other variables 
such as education and marital status, below we report on the gender wage ratios by age based on 
multivariate regressions that control for other characteristics. 
[Figure 12.2 and 12.3 about here] 
 The decline in the gender wage ratio with age is also evident if one follows birth cohorts 
in the CHIP sample over time.  For example, consider individuals born in the years 1968 through 
1972.  This five-year birth cohort entered the labor force in 1995, at which time its members 
were between the ages of 23 and 27.  In that year the average gender wage ratio for this cohort 
was 101 percent, that is, on average women and men in this age group received the same wages.  
Seven years later (2002) when this cohort reached the ages of 30 to 34, its gender wage ratio had 
fallen to 84 percent.  Five years later (2007) at ages between 35 and 39, its gender wage ratio had 
fallen further to 68 percent.  In 2013 at ages between 41 and 45 the ratio remained at 69 percent.   
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 The next five-year birth cohort, born in the years 1973 through 1977, had not yet entered 
the labor force in 1995.  Seven years later (in 2002) at ages 25‒29, its gender wage ratio was 90 
percent.  Five years later (in 2007) at ages 30‒34, the gender wage ratio of this birth cohort had 
declined to 79 percent, where it remained in 2013, at ages 36‒40.  These cohort-based patterns 
reveal that the gender wage gap is small when women enter the labor force but widens over time 
spent in the labor force.   
 With respect to education, the gender wage ratio has followed a two-step pattern that is 
lower for education levels up through high school and higher for vocational secondary school, 
vocational post-secondary school, college, and above (see Figure 12.3).  The gender wage ratio 
shifted downward for the least educated from 1995 to 2002 and shifted downward again for all 
education groups from 2002 to 2007.  From 2007 to 2013 the curve remained unchanged except 
for the least-educated subgroup, primary school and lower, for which the gender ratio improved.  
As of 2013, the gender wage ratios for primary education and lower, middle school, and general 
high school were roughly 70 percent, and for higher levels of education they were 77‒79 percent.  
These differences in the gender wage ratio across education levels to some extent are correlated 
with age, as older cohorts tend to have less education.  Below we examine the relationship 
between education and the gender wage ratio using a multivariate regression to control for 
correlated characteristics.   
 Table 12.4 reports the wage ratios for additional subgroups of interest.  The gender wage 
ratio was close to 100 percent for single individuals in all years, indicating little or no gender 
wage gap.  For married individuals, however, the wage ratio was lower and it declined markedly 
to 70 percent in 2007 and then remained basically unchanged at 72 percent in 2013.  This pattern 
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by marital status is consistent with that found in other countries.  Married women typically earn 
less than married men.     
 The gender wage ratio also varies by the number of children.  In all years the gender 
wage ratio is lower for women with children than for women without children.  Among all such 
subgroups the gender wage ratio deteriorated between 1995 and 2007.  From 2007 to 2013 the 
increase in the wage ratio was most noticeable for women without children.   
 The gender wage ratio varies by ownership of the work unit and sector of employment.  
In most years the gender wage ratio was highest in public and state-owned work units.  These 
subgroups include more highly educated workers, so their higher wages may reflect differences 
in education.  With respect to sectors, increasingly few urban workers were employed in the 
primary sector.  For the secondary and tertiary sectors, we do not see a clear pattern, except that 
for both sectors the gender wage ratios declined to about 70 percent in 2007 but then recovered 
between 2007 and 2013.  Such differences in the gender wage ratios across ownership and 
occupation suggest that structural changes in the urban economy may be associated with trends 
in the gender wage gap.    
 
IV. Empirical Methodology 
 
Our empirical analysis is mainly based on an estimation of Mincer wage earnings equations 
using ordinary least squares (OLS) with standard errors adjusted to reflect the clustering arising 
from the survey sampling design.  First, we estimate regressions pooling women and men 
together using the regression equation: 
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𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 ,         (1) 
 
where for each individual i the ln of wage earnings ln Yi is a function of whether the individual is 
female (Female equals one if female, zero otherwise), plus j other characteristics Xji and the 
residual µi. The coefficient of interest is ?̂?𝛽, which indicates the presence of a gender wage gap 
after controlling for other characteristics.   
 Using the results from the estimation of Equation (1) we calculate the gender wage gap in 
percentage terms after controlling for other characteristics.  As discussed in Giles (2011), in a 
semi-log regression the estimator of the percentage effect p of a dummy variable on the outcome 
variable is given by 
 
𝑝𝑝 = 𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐
𝑒𝑒(0.5∗𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐) − 1  ,                                  (2) 
 
where c is the OLS estimate of the coefficient on the dummy variable and Vc is the estimated 
variance of that coefficient (see also Halvorsen and Palmqvist 1980). 
 To explore more fully the impact of marriage and children on the gender wage gap, we 
also estimate the pooled wage equations with added interactions between the gender dummy 
variable and the dummy variables for marital status and the number of children under the age of 
16.  The estimation equation is now: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽0𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽2(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) +
𝛽𝛽3(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑂𝑂𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽4(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) + 𝛾𝛾1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹 +
𝛾𝛾2𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3𝑂𝑂𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾4𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=5 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 .        (3) 
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The omitted reference group is male, married, with no children.  Using estimates from this 
equation and the formula for the percentage effect (Equation [2]), we calculate the gender wage 
gaps for each of the following subgroups:  single with no children (the sum of the percentage 
effects of 𝛽𝛽0 and 𝛽𝛽1); married with no children (the percentage effect of 𝛽𝛽0); married with one 
child (the sum of the percentage effects of 𝛽𝛽0 and 𝛽𝛽3); and married with more than one child (the 
sum of the percentage effects of 𝛽𝛽0 and 𝛽𝛽4).  
 Second, we estimate wage equations for women and men separately.  For each of the 
female and male samples we estimate Equation (1), but without the dummy variable Female.  As 
above, in some specifications we include dummy variables for ownership of the individual’s 
work unit, occupation, and sector of employment.   
 The estimated coefficients from the separate wage equations are used to carry out a 
decomposition of the gender wage gap.  According to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
(Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973), the difference between average ln male and average ln female 
wages can be written as: 
  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚������ − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓������ = �𝛼𝛼�𝑚𝑚 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾�𝑗𝑗,𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 𝑋𝑋𝚥𝚥,𝑚𝑚������ − (𝛼𝛼�𝑓𝑓 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾�𝑗𝑗,𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗 𝑋𝑋𝚥𝚥,𝑓𝑓�����),        (4) 
  
where the bars indicate the mean values for males m and females f.  The difference in average ln 
wages can then be divided into two components: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚������ − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓������ =  �(𝛼𝛼�𝑚𝑚 − 𝛼𝛼�𝑓𝑓) + ∑ (𝛾𝛾�𝑗𝑗,𝑚𝑚 − 𝛾𝛾�𝑗𝑗,𝑓𝑓)𝑗𝑗 𝑋𝑋𝚥𝚥,𝑚𝑚������ + �∑ 𝛾𝛾�𝑗𝑗,𝑓𝑓�𝑋𝑋𝚥𝚥,𝑚𝑚����� − 𝑋𝑋𝚥𝚥,𝑓𝑓������𝑗𝑗 �  .     (5) 
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The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (5) is that portion of the wage difference that 
can be attributed to differences between male and female coefficients, including the constant 
terms (the “unexplained” portion).  The second term is the portion of the wage difference that 
can be attributed to differences between male and female characteristics (the “explained” 
portion). 
 In all wage regressions, the dependent variable is the ln of monthly wage earnings.  For 
1995, 2002, and 2007 we use the NBS wage variable in the CHIP dataset; for 2013, we use the 
adjusted 2013 wage variable.  Individual characteristics include dummy variables for marital 
status, number of children, ethnicity, age group, and education level.  Dummy variables for 
province of residence control for provincial fixed effects.  In some specifications, we include 
dummy variables for the ownership of the individual’s work unit, occupation, and the sector of 
employment.  All variables are from the CHIP datasets, and all estimates are carried out using 
two-level weights.     
 
V.  Pooled Wage Equations:  Results 
A.  Results of the Basic Specification 
Estimates of the coefficient ?̂?𝛽 are reported in Table 12.5.  The first row gives estimates from 
wage equations estimated without, and the second row with, controls for sector of ownership, 
occupation, and sector of production.  The estimates are uniformly negative and significant, 
indicating an urban gender wage gap that is robust to specification and that persists over time.  
The coefficients are smaller with than without the additional controls, reflecting that women tend 
to work in lower-wage sectors and occupations than men.   
[Table 12.5 about here] 
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 Changes in the magnitude of the ?̂?𝛽 coefficient over time confirm that the gender wage 
gap widened from 1995 to 2007, but narrowed from 2007 to 2013.    Without controls for sector 
and occupation, the gender wage gap increased from 12 percent in 1995 to 18 percent in 2002 to 
27 percent in 2007, and then decreased to 24 percent in 2013.  With controls for sector and 
occupation, the gap increased from 10 percent in 1995 to 15 percent in 2002 to 22 percent in 
2007, and then decreased to 19 percent in 2013.   
 Our regression-based estimates of the urban gender wage gap are similar to those in the 
literature, which indicate a widening trend in the gap during years prior to 2010.  Li and Song 
(2013) report estimated coefficients on the gender dummy variable based on regressions using 
the urban CHIP data without controls for sector/occupation of 0.12, 0.20, and 0.27 in 1995, 2002, 
and 2007, respectively.  Liu (2011) reports estimated coefficients based on regressions using 
urban data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey of about 0.15 for the late 1990s and early 
2000s.       
 Full results from the pooled wage equations are reported in the Appendix Tables 12A.1, 
12A.2, and 12A.3; here we note selected findings of interest.  The coefficient on single marital 
status in all cases is negative and significant, ranging from ‒.17 to ‒.24 (married is the omitted 
reference category), with no clear trend over time.  This result indicates that after controlling for 
other characteristics such as age and education, single individuals have lower wages, thus 
suggesting the presence of a marriage wage premium.  The coefficients on the dummy variable 
for one child are largely insignificant, but the coefficients on the dummy variable for two or 
more children are significant and negative in 2002, 2007, and 2013 in the regressions that do not 
include controls for sector/ownership.  These results indicate no wage penalty for the first child 
but a wage penalty for two or more children, as compared to no children.  The fact that the 
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coefficients on two or more children are closer to zero and mostly not significant when controls 
for occupation/sector are included in the regression suggests that people with two or more 
children may sort into lower wage occupations and sectors.   
 The coefficients on the age variables indicate that in general wages rise with age up 
through the early 40s and then they level out. The estimated coefficients on education are mostly 
significant and consistent with expectations, with higher levels of education producing higher 
returns.  Moreover, the additional returns to higher levels of education compared to lower levels 
of education increased substantially over time, especially from 1995 to 2007.  The steepening of 
the education-earnings relationship implies that differences in education would increasingly 
generate wage inequality.    
 We see the expected patterns for ownership of work unit, occupation, and sector of 
employment.  Estimates of the relevant coefficients are shown in Table 12.6.  With respect to 
sector of ownership, in all years except for 1995 the coefficients are negative and significant, 
indicating that wages are highest in the reference category, i.e., the state sector.  Moreover, the 
magnitude of the wage difference is large.  In 2013, for example, the log point difference in 
wages between the state sector and the non-state sector was 0.23‒0.24.  Since proportionately 
fewer women than men are employed in the state sector, these wage differentials are relevant to 
the gender wage gap. 
[Table 12.6 about here] 
 With respect to production sector, the reference category is manufacturing.  As shown in 
Table 12.6, the coefficients for construction and mining are either positive and significant or not 
significant, which implies that wages in construction and mining have been similar to or higher 
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than wages in manufacturing.  As of 2013, wages in construction and mining were not 
significantly different from those in manufacturing.   
 How do wages in the tertiary sector, which employs a high proportion of women, 
compare for women and men?  The coefficients differ among the tertiary sectors and across the 
years, but as of 2013 none of the tertiary sector industries had positive, significant coefficients, 
and four had negative, significant coefficients.  In other words, as of 2013 no tertiary sectors paid 
wages higher than those in the secondary sectors, and some paid significantly less than the 
secondary sectors.  As the pattern of employment across sectors is not the same for women and 
men, these wage differences across production sectors contribute to the underlying raw gender 
wage gap.  
   
B.  With Interactions between Gender, Marital Status, and Children 
Table 12.7 reports the estimated 𝛽𝛽 coefficients from the pooled regression with interactions 
between the gender dummy variable and dummy variables for life events, as in Equation (2).  
Figure 12.4 shows the gender wage ratio in terms of percentage for each life event group, 
calculated using the estimated coefficients.  These coefficients and ratios control for other 
characteristics such as age, education, location, etc. and thus they provide a clearer picture of the 
relationship between life events and wages.     
[Table 12.7 about here] 
[Figure 12.4 about here] 
 As shown in Figure 12.4, in 1995 when wages were largely determined administratively, 
differences in the gender coefficient across life event groups were modest.  However, the 
differences widened in later years.  In all years the gender wage ratios for singles remained high, 
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fluctuating but always above 90 percent.  In other words, for single women and men the wage 
gap was either nonexistent or small.  For married groups, however, the wage ratio deteriorated.  
Regardless of the number of children, the wage ratio for married women declined markedly from 
80‒90 percent in 1995 to below 75 percent in 2007.  Between 2007 and 2013 the gender wage 
ratios for those married without children recovered substantially, but for those married with one 
or more children the ratios declined slightly.     
 Thus, as of 2013 and after controlling for other characteristics such as education, 
ethnicity, location, etc., the gender wage gap was smallest for individuals who were single with 
no children.  The gap widened progressively from being single, to being married, to being 
married with one child, and to being married with more than one child.  In 2013 single women 
without children earned only 3 percent less than single men without children.  Married women 
without children earned 22 percent less than married men without children.  Married women 
with children earned 30 to 33 percent less than married men with the same number of children. 
 These estimates indicate that the life event with the greatest impact on the gender wage 
gap is marriage.  As will be seen in the separate female and male regressions, the impact of 
marriage on earnings differs for women and men.      
 
VI. Separate Wage Equations for Women and Men and Oaxaca-Blinder Decompositions 
A.  Results of Separate Wage Equations for Women and Men 
In this section, we report and discuss selected results of interest from separate wage equations for 
women and men—specifically the results related to age, education, and life events (see the 
Appendix Tables 12A.1, 12A.2, and 12A.3 for the full results).  The estimates without and with 
controls for ownership sector, occupation, and production sector are similar, so here we only 
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discuss the results from the regressions without these controls.  We mainly focus on the estimates 
for 2007 and 2013.   
 Figure 12.5 plots the age-earnings profiles of women and men for 2007 and 2013 based 
on the predicted wages from the separate female and male wage equations, expressed in constant 
2013 prices.  All characteristics except age are held constant and set equal to their respective 
means for each gender.  As expected, in both years men’s wages are on average higher than 
women’s wages at all ages.  In both years and for both women and men, the age-earnings 
relationship is steeper at younger ages and it flattens or turns down at older ages.  Consistent 
with the younger statutory retirement age for women, the flattening of the age-earnings curve 
begins earlier for women.  In 2013, for example, the wages of women rose with age through age 
35‒39, after which they remain flat for the two oldest age groups.  For men, wages rise with age 
through ages 40‒44, after which they decline for the oldest age group.   
[Figure 12.5 about here] 
 The implications of these age-earnings curves for gender wage ratios are shown in Figure 
12.6, which plots the gender wage ratios using the predicted wages in Figure 12.5.  In 2007 the 
gender wage ratios do not change much with age.  From 2007 to 2013, however, the wages of 
women in younger age groups caught up with the wages of men, so that the gender wage ratios 
improved for these subgroups.  For older age groups, however, the catch-up was either smaller or 
nonexistent.  Consequently, in 2013 the gender wage gap was two-tiered, at 20 percent for 
younger age groups and at 25‒30 percent for older age groups. 
[Figure 12.6 about here] 
 More education is associated with higher earnings for both women and men.  Figure 12.7 
plots the education-earnings profiles for women and men in 2007 and 2013 based on the 
 
 
28 
 
predicted wages.  Earnings for both women and men increase with education.  Moreover, the 
curves become notably steeper from 2007 to 2013, indicating increasing returns to additional 
years of education.  However, in both 2007 and 2013, at all education levels women’s wages are 
below men’s wages.  To attain the same wage level as men, women must have an education that 
is at least one step higher than that of men.  For example, as shown in the figure, in 2013 an 
average woman with a high school education earned about the same wage as an average man 
with a primary school education or lower, and an average woman with a college education or 
higher earned about the same wage as an average man with a vocational post-secondary 
education.    
[Figure 12.7 about here] 
[Figure 12.8 about here] 
 Figure 12.8 gives the regression-based gender wage ratios by education level calculated 
using the predicted wages in Figure 12.7.  In 2007 the gender wage ratio rose steeply with the 
level of education, from 58 percent for primary education and less to 82 percent for college 
education and higher.  Between 2007 and 2013 the ratio improved substantially for the two 
lowest education groups and changed only slightly for the higher education groups.  As of 2013 
an average woman with a primary education or less earned 75 percent that of an average man 
with the same level of education.  For those with a middle-school education the ratio was 70 
percent, and for those with a college education or higher it increased to 80 percent.   
 The separate female and male regressions provide information about the differential 
impact of marriage and children on the earnings of both women and men.  Studies in other 
countries have found that after controlling for other characteristics, married men earn more than 
single men, thus enjoying a “marriage premium.”  For women, the opposite is the case, that is, 
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women experience a “marriage penalty.”  Furthermore, men with children tend to earn more than 
men without children, whereas the opposite is true for women.  There is some debate regarding 
the explanations for such differentials, e.g., whether this is due to time out of the labor force or 
differences in productivity. Such premiums and penalties can underlie the gender wage gaps 
within life event groups, as discussed earlier.5 
 Our estimates indeed reveal differences between women and men in the estimated 
coefficients on marital status and children, as reported in Table 12.8 for 2007 and 2013.  The 
patterns, however, are somewhat different than those found in other countries.  The coefficients 
on the marital status dummy variables are significant for both women and men and indicate that 
both women and men enjoy a marriage premium, although the premium for women is smaller 
than that for men.  From 2007 to 2013 the male marriage premium declined, so that the gender 
difference narrowed.  As of 2013, the log point difference between married men and single men 
was 0.25 and that between married women and single women was 0.15.   
[Table 12.8 about here] 
 With respect to children, the estimates indicate that, overall, having children has little 
effect on men’s earnings:  for men, the coefficients on the children dummy variables are all 
insignificant. For women, the coefficients on the dummy variable for having a single child are 
insignificant but the coefficients for having two or more children are (weakly) significant and 
negative, suggesting the presence of a wage penalty for women with more than one child.6    
    
B.  Decomposition Results 
                                                          
5 See Ribar (2004), Rodgers and Stratton (2010), and Schoeni (1995) for reviews of the literature on wage 
premiums and penalties associated with marital status and children. 
6 Note that in some years the number of women with two or more children in the dataset is small, which 
might lead to imprecise estimates and thus the weak significance of this coefficient.  The number of 
women with two or more children in 1995 is 196, in 2002 it is 46, in 2007 it is 93, and in 2013 it is 96. 
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The results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions based on the separate ln wage equations for 
women and men are shown in Table 12.9.  The “explained” component of the decomposition is 
the share of the difference in ln wages between men and women that can be attributed to 
differences in the average endowments of women and men, that is, differences in the means of 
characteristics, such as age, education, and so on.  The remainder, or “unexplained,” component 
of the difference can be attributed to differences in the estimated coefficients and constant terms 
for women and men, and it may reflect discrimination as well as unobserved factors that are not 
captured by the regressions. 
[Table 12.9 about here] 
 As shown in the table, a large majority of the difference in ln wages between men and 
women is unexplained.  Without controls for sector/ownership, the unexplained portion was 87‒
90 percent of the gender gap in 1995, 2002, and 2007, and it rose to 97 percent in 2013.  
Differences in endowments contributed the remainder, roughly 10‒13 percent of the gender gap 
in 1995, 2002, and 2007, and only 3 percent of the gender gap in 2013.  With sector/occupation 
controls, the contribution of endowments is larger, no less than 25 percent in all years and the 
unexplained contribution is accordingly smaller.  Here, the ownership of the work unit, 
occupation, and sector of employment are treated as endowments, so the fact that women tend to 
work in lower-wage sectors and occupations increases the explained component of the gender 
wage gap.  Regardless, with or without the controls, most of the gender wage gap is unexplained.  
In other words, differences between women and men in terms of the observed characteristics 
were not the major source of the gender wage gap.  Rather, the gender wage gap was largely 
unexplained. 
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 To what extent are changes over time in the gender wage gap the result of changes in the 
contributions of endowments versus the contributions of the coefficients?  From 1995 to 2007 
the total differential between men and women in the ln wage (T) increased, but from 2007 to 
2013 it declined.  The decomposition results reveal that the increase in the differential from 1995 
to 2007 was associated with increases in both the difference due to endowments (E) and to the 
difference due to the coefficients, including the constant terms (C).  Similarly, the decline from 
2007 to 2013 was associated with declines in both these components.  In all years, however, the 
contribution of endowments was relatively small.  In other words, changes over time in the 
gender wage gap, including the decline in the gender wage gap from 2007 to 2013, reflect 
changes in both the explained and unexplained components of the gap, but especially changes in 
the unexplained component.     
 
VII. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, we provide consistent estimates of the gender wage gap in urban China from 
1995 to 2013 and investigate factors contributing to this gap.  From 1995 to 2007 we find a 
substantial and progressive widening of the gap.  From 2007 to 2013 we find that the gender 
wage gap narrowed. 
 Changes in China’s gender wage gap are related to changes in the urban economy as well 
as to changes in government policies that have different effects on women and men.  
Employment of both women and men has been shifting from the higher-paid to the lower-paid 
sectors, specifically from the state-owned sector to the non-state-owned sector and from the 
secondary sector to the tertiary sector.  Women continue to be disproportionately employed in 
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the lower-paid sectors.  These sectoral patterns contribute to the persistent gender wage 
differential.   
 Policies relevant to the gender wage gap include the minimum wage policy, the 
expansion of higher education, parental leave regulations, and retirement policies.  Our findings 
indicate that recent changes in these policies in China have likely contributed to the narrowing of 
the gender wage gap after 2007.  Retirement age policies, however, have remained unchanged 
and continue to mandate earlier retirement by women, thus depressing the earnings of older 
women relative to those of older men.    
 Changes in China’s gender wage gap are also related to life-cycle events.  In our data, the 
proportion of single individuals gradually increased for both women and men, but more so for 
women.  Concurrently, the number of children slowly declined for both women and men.  These 
trends in life-cycle events tend to moderate the gender wage gap because the gender wage 
differentials are smaller for single people than they are for married people and for people with no 
children or one child compared to those with more than one child.    
 What factors underlie the recent narrowing of the gender wage gap?  Our decomposition 
analysis shows that to some extent the narrowing is due to the convergence of characteristics 
between women and men, that is, a reduction in the “explained” component of the gap.  In this 
regard, the main change has been in terms of education.  Between 2007 and 2013 differences in 
the education levels of women and men narrowed.  Notably, the proportion of women with 
college educations or higher caught up to that of men.   
 The recent narrowing of the gender wage gap also reflects a reduction in the differences 
in the estimated coefficients or returns to the characteristics of women and men, that is, a 
reduction in the “unexplained” component of the gap.  Our estimates from the separate female 
 
 
33 
 
and male regressions indicate that the reduction in this unexplained component of the wage gap 
between 2007 and 2013 was mainly driven by changes in the returns to several specific 
characteristics:  being young (ages 25‒39), having less education (middle school or less), being 
unmarried, and being married without children.   
  Recent changes in the coefficients on young ages and lower levels of education could 
reflect increases in minimum wage levels and strengthened enforcement of the minimum wage.  
Minimum wage policies compress wage differentials, including the gender wage gap, for low-
paid groups, which are mainly composed of young and unskilled workers.  At the other end of 
the age spectrum, our estimates show that older workers continue to experience a larger gender 
wage gap.  This is not surprising given the lack of any change in the statutory retirement ages for 
women and men.  If the proposed changes to the statutory retirement age include a reduction in 
the retirement age differential between women and men, it is possible that in the future the 
gender wage gap for older age groups will shrink. 
  Reductions in the gender wage gap for those who are single and have no children or who 
are married with only one child may be related to improvements in parental leave regulations and 
maternity insurance.   In principle, these policy changes should lower the costs of maternity 
leave for employers, so employers would have less of an incentive to discriminate against 
women who are at “risk” of having children.        
 Is the new direction in China’s urban gender wage gap a short-term or a long-term 
phenomenon?  Prediction is a difficult business, but our analysis provides some basis for 
speculation.  First, we suggest that the trend in the gender wage gap from 2007 to 2013 was not 
due to the short-term economic impact of the global financial crisis.  The global financial crisis 
began a year after 2007 and the recovery was well underway by 2013.  Second, many of the 
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underlying changes in the gender wage differences from 2007 to 2013 were related to secular 
changes in the economic structure, long-term trends in individual characteristics, such as 
education, marriage, and children, and policy changes that are ongoing and that are likely to 
continue.   
 Yet it is possible that some recent developments might offset these trends, in particular 
the recent relaxation of the one-child policy.  Our analysis identifies a significant, positive 
relationship between having multiple children and the gender wage gap.  This relationship 
reflects the heavier child-care burden on women, indicating the lack of well-funded child-care 
options (Guo and Xiao 2013; Du and Dong 2013; Qi and Dong 2013, 2016).  Moreover, in a 
setting where the government mandates generous parental leaves for women but not for men and 
in which some of the costs of those leaves are still borne by the employers, the relaxation of the 
one-child policy will exacerbate the negative incentives for employers and will have future 
consequences for the gender wage gap.       
    Although we discuss the relationship between patterns in the gender wage gap and 
concurrent structural changes and policy measures, we do not formally analyze these 
relationships.  In addition, our estimates of the gender wage gap are not corrected for selection, 
that is, we do not employ estimation methods that consider the possibility that the differences in 
the wages of women and men are affected by gender differences in wage job participation.  
Nevertheless, our findings provide a starting point for further research in these areas. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A12.1. Full results of the pooled wage equations 
 
 
without sector and occupation controls with sector and occupation controls 
1995 2002 2007 2013 1995 2002 2007 2013 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
female -0.132*** -0.200*** -0.319*** -0.270*** -0.106*** -0.162*** -0.252*** -0.213*** 
 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.022) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.022) 
single -0.199*** -0.196*** -0.238*** -0.197*** -0.196*** -0.169*** -0.229*** -0.178*** 
 
(0.044) (0.043) (0.037) (0.054) (0.047) (0.041) (0.036) (0.053) 
other marital status 0.030 -0.091 -0.082 0.070 0.045 -0.065 -0.043 0.100** 
 
(0.066) (0.060) (0.054) (0.054) (0.063) (0.058) (0.046) (0.050) 
1 minor child -0.011 -0.021 -0.028 0.012 0.000 -0.015 -0.029* 0.007 
 
(0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.029) (0.018) (0.021) (0.017) (0.029) 
2 or more minor children -0.036 -0.110* -0.154** -0.105* 0.001 -0.042 -0.141** -0.060 
 
(0.034) (0.062) (0.063) (0.061) (0.033) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
ages 30‒34 0.129*** 0.124*** 0.096*** 0.261*** 0.106*** 0.092*** 0.077** 0.258*** 
 
(0.026) (0.037) (0.032) (0.041) (0.027) (0.035) (0.031) (0.040) 
ages 35‒39 0.237*** 0.233*** 0.148*** 0.377*** 0.216*** 0.185*** 0.115*** 0.345*** 
 
(0.025) (0.036) (0.031) (0.042) (0.025) (0.034) (0.030) (0.041) 
ages 40‒44 0.293*** 0.276*** 0.141*** 0.420*** 0.250*** 0.208*** 0.099*** 0.388*** 
 
(0.024) (0.035) (0.030) (0.042) (0.025) (0.033) (0.029) (0.039) 
ages 45‒49 0.278*** 0.312*** 0.151*** 0.405*** 0.242*** 0.230*** 0.103*** 0.354*** 
 
(0.028) (0.038) (0.033) (0.046) (0.029) (0.036) (0.032) (0.044) 
minority -0.069** 0.055 -0.026 -0.046 -0.083*** 0.055 -0.019 0.029 
 
(0.027) (0.037) (0.039) (0.077) (0.028) (0.037) (0.036) (0.054) 
middle school 0.152*** 0.134** 0.135* 0.102* 0.102*** 0.105* 0.079 0.075 
 
(0.028) (0.053) (0.075) (0.056) (0.029) (0.054) (0.070) (0.055) 
high school 0.223*** 0.336*** 0.294*** 0.359*** 0.131*** 0.248*** 0.179** 0.307*** 
 
(0.029) (0.053) (0.074) (0.057) (0.030) (0.055) (0.070) (0.056) 
vocational secondary school 0.390*** 0.545*** 0.482*** 0.438*** 0.213*** 0.354*** 0.294*** 0.325*** 
 
(0.029) (0.055) (0.076) (0.059) (0.031) (0.058) (0.072) (0.059) 
vocational post-secondary school 0.409*** 0.690*** 0.685*** 0.698*** 0.213*** 0.422*** 0.442*** 0.568*** 
 
(0.028) (0.053) (0.074) (0.055) (0.032) (0.056) (0.071) (0.057) 
college and higher 0.512*** 0.923*** 0.953*** 0.983*** 0.285*** 0.584*** 0.641*** 0.784*** 
 
(0.031) (0.055) (0.075) (0.054) (0.035) (0.060) (0.072) (0.061) 
collective sector 
    
-0.246*** -0.250*** -0.225*** -0.242*** 
     
(0.021) (0.028) (0.029) (0.051) 
private/joint venture/foreign 
owned 
    
0.142* -0.241*** -0.162*** -0.229*** 
     
(0.073) (0.030) (0.017) (0.030) 
other ownership 
    
-0.107 -0.134*** -0.399*** -0.335*** 
     
(0.094) (0.026) (0.032) (0.051) 
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commercial or service worker 
     
-0.246*** -0.101*** -0.002 
      
(0.033) (0.028) (0.044) 
office worker 
    
0.066*** 0.087*** 0.075*** 0.088** 
     
(0.018) (0.023) (0.022) (0.040) 
official or manager 
    
0.173*** 0.229*** 0.216*** 0.114* 
     
(0.021) (0.031) (0.034) (0.065) 
professional or technician 
    
0.143*** 0.140*** 0.171*** 0.141*** 
     
(0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.044) 
agricultural and related 
      
-0.071 -0.265* 
       
(0.081) (0.136) 
others 
    
0.002 -0.384*** -0.044 -0.094 
     
(0.037) (0.070) (0.038) (0.063) 
agriculture 
    
-0.054 0.038 0.016 -0.131 
     
(0.060) (0.047) (0.063) (0.114) 
mining 
    
0.127*** -0.048 0.330*** 0.100 
     
(0.041) (0.043) (0.053) (0.094) 
construction 
    
0.084** -0.024 0.015 -0.008 
     
(0.035) (0.046) (0.044) (0.065) 
public utilities     -0.014 0.006 0.171*** -0.065 
     (0.038) (0.025) (0.029) (0.057) 
transportation and communication 
    
0.060* 0.124*** 0.068*** 0.059 
     
(0.032) (0.030) (0.026) (0.053) 
commerce and trade 
    
-0.109*** -0.025 -0.027 -0.149*** 
     
(0.021) (0.035) (0.028) (0.045) 
finance and insurance 
    
0.229*** 0.121*** -0.066** -0.200*** 
     
(0.041) (0.042) (0.026) (0.044) 
education and culture 
    
-0.003 0.090*** 0.048* -0.230*** 
     
(0.019) (0.028) (0.028) (0.055) 
health and social welfare 
    
0.038 0.171*** 0.177*** -0.093 
     
(0.025) (0.031) (0.039) (0.059) 
scientific research and technology 
    
0.110*** 0.187*** 0.200*** 0.009 
     
(0.026) (0.063) (0.040) (0.073) 
government and social 
organizations 
    
0.002 0.068** 0.018 -0.180*** 
     
(0.018) (0.027) (0.025) (0.049) 
Beijing -0.205*** -0.252*** -0.091*** 0.154*** -0.215*** -0.239*** -0.135*** 0.131*** 
 
(0.027) (0.037) (0.026) (0.039) (0.028) (0.037) (0.025) (0.038) 
Shanxi -0.499*** -0.459*** -0.284*** -0.106** -0.512*** -0.488*** -0.394*** -0.180*** 
 
(0.027) (0.038) (0.027) (0.048) (0.027) (0.038) (0.026) (0.051) 
Liaoning -0.393*** -0.332*** -0.422*** -0.027 -0.380*** -0.263*** -0.427*** -0.065 
 
(0.026) (0.034) (0.027) (0.057) (0.027) (0.033) (0.025) (0.055) 
Jiangsu -0.166*** -0.254*** 0.020 0.255*** -0.124*** -0.237*** 0.030 0.225*** 
 
(0.025) (0.034) (0.032) (0.042) (0.025) (0.033) (0.031) (0.042) 
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Anhui -0.381*** -0.338*** -0.203*** 0.063 -0.357*** -0.336*** -0.257*** 0.017 
 
(0.027) (0.035) (0.027) (0.050) (0.027) (0.034) (0.026) (0.049) 
Henan -0.479*** -0.336*** -0.343*** -0.041 -0.476*** -0.379*** -0.408*** -0.091** 
 
(0.028) (0.031) (0.026) (0.044) (0.028) (0.030) (0.025) (0.044) 
Hubei -0.356*** -0.391*** -0.292*** -0.096** -0.363*** -0.397*** -0.302*** -0.169*** 
 
(0.025) (0.031) (0.033) (0.047) (0.025) (0.031) (0.030) (0.046) 
Chongqing -0.174*** -0.190*** -0.178*** 0.020 -0.194*** -0.189*** -0.147*** 0.014 
 
(0.035) (0.039) (0.031) (0.056) (0.036) (0.037) (0.031) (0.058) 
Sichuan -0.329*** -0.307*** -0.299*** 0.005 -0.324*** -0.270*** -0.321*** -0.010 
 
(0.026) (0.034) (0.028) (0.049) (0.027) (0.033) (0.027) (0.048) 
Yunnan -0.228*** -0.165*** -0.313*** -0.157*** -0.252*** -0.216*** -0.345*** -0.167*** 
 
(0.023) (0.031) (0.029) (0.056) (0.024) (0.030) (0.027) (0.055) 
Gansu -0.464*** -0.420*** -0.458*** -0.193*** -0.502*** -0.421*** -0.521*** -0.250*** 
 
(0.028) (0.039) (0.028) (0.060) (0.029) (0.037) (0.027) (0.060) 
Constant 5.925*** 6.357*** 7.008*** 7.083*** 6.011*** 6.529*** 7.229*** 7.410*** 
 
(0.041) (0.068) (0.081) (0.071) (0.044) (0.068) (0.080) (0.077) 
         Observations 8,858 7,380 8,061 4,815 8,278 7,064 8,019 4,633 
R-squared 0.193 0.234 0.301 0.240 0.248 0.315 0.379 0.278 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1  
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Table A12.2. Full results of the separate wage equations, without sector/occupation controls 
   
 
 
Without sector/occupation controls 
male 1995 
female 
1995 male 2002 
female 
2002 male 2007 
female 
2007 male 2013 
female 
2013 
single -0.199*** -0.176** -0.264*** -0.107* -0.318*** -0.153*** -0.253*** -0.151** 
  (0.049) (0.081) (0.060) (0.062) (0.049) (0.054) (0.074) (0.074) 
other marital status -0.158 0.114 -0.066 -0.088 -0.324*** -0.016 -0.009 0.151** 
  (0.124) (0.076) (0.077) (0.079) (0.100) (0.061) (0.086) (0.072) 
1 minor child -0.029 -0.002 -0.008 -0.044 -0.039 -0.036 0.062 -0.064 
  (0.021) (0.030) (0.026) (0.035) (0.025) (0.026) (0.042) (0.040) 
2 or more minor children -0.023 -0.060 -0.077 -0.176* -0.159* -0.173** -0.053 -0.204** 
  (0.037) (0.060) (0.081) (0.092) (0.090) (0.086) (0.085) (0.083) 
ages 30‒34 0.194*** 0.089** 0.080 0.183*** 0.077* 0.123*** 0.259*** 0.266*** 
  (0.034) (0.037) (0.059) (0.047) (0.045) (0.045) (0.060) (0.057) 
ages 35‒39 0.265*** 0.231*** 0.177*** 0.307*** 0.147*** 0.169*** 0.360*** 0.386*** 
  (0.035) (0.034) (0.058) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043) (0.060) (0.056) 
ages 40‒44 0.315*** 0.292*** 0.233*** 0.331*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.466*** 0.345*** 
  (0.032) (0.035) (0.057) (0.045) (0.042) (0.043) (0.057) (0.061) 
ages 45‒49 0.332*** 0.234*** 0.285*** 0.339*** 0.145*** 0.149*** 0.415*** 0.372*** 
  (0.034) (0.045) (0.058) (0.052) (0.045) (0.048) (0.063) (0.065) 
minority -0.046 -0.089** 0.020 0.060 -0.019 -0.035 0.064 -0.160 
  (0.036) (0.041) (0.053) (0.050) (0.051) (0.055) (0.075) (0.133) 
middle school 0.148*** 0.146*** 0.095 0.166** 0.065 0.153 0.101 0.063 
  (0.041) (0.039) (0.062) (0.082) (0.110) (0.099) (0.090) (0.069) 
high school 0.203*** 0.229*** 0.268*** 0.405*** 0.166 0.358*** 0.340*** 0.333*** 
  (0.043) (0.039) (0.062) (0.082) (0.109) (0.097) (0.090) (0.074) 
vocational secondary 0.325*** 0.438*** 0.390*** 0.690*** 0.323*** 0.571*** 0.404*** 0.444*** 
  (0.041) (0.041) (0.065) (0.084) (0.111) (0.100) (0.095) (0.074) 
vocational post-
secondary  0.335*** 0.487*** 0.547*** 0.844*** 0.536*** 0.768*** 0.668*** 0.690*** 
  (0.041) (0.040) (0.061) (0.082) (0.108) (0.098) (0.088) (0.071) 
college and higher 0.443*** 0.596*** 0.785*** 1.103*** 0.769*** 1.087*** 0.928*** 1.003*** 
  (0.043) (0.044) (0.063) (0.086) (0.110) (0.099) (0.087) (0.069) 
Beijing -0.208*** -0.208*** -0.139*** -0.374*** -0.139*** -0.052 0.169*** 0.139*** 
  (0.038) (0.039) (0.049) (0.053) (0.035) (0.038) (0.059) (0.052) 
Shanxi -0.471*** -0.526*** -0.406*** -0.532*** -0.343*** -0.230*** 0.064 -0.325*** 
  (0.035) (0.041) (0.049) (0.059) (0.035) (0.040) (0.067) (0.069) 
Liaoning -0.390*** -0.399*** -0.266*** -0.403*** -0.401*** -0.456*** -0.020 -0.036 
  (0.037) (0.038) (0.046) (0.049) (0.038) (0.039) (0.089) (0.071) 
Jiangsu -0.184*** -0.140*** -0.231*** -0.267*** 0.011 0.033 0.274*** 0.241*** 
  (0.033) (0.037) (0.043) (0.052) (0.045) (0.046) (0.064) (0.052) 
Anhui -0.373*** -0.383*** -0.279*** -0.407*** -0.224*** -0.180*** 0.199*** -0.083 
  (0.036) (0.040) (0.045) (0.053) (0.037) (0.039) (0.070) (0.071) 
Henan -0.484*** -0.467*** -0.309*** -0.361*** -0.443*** -0.249*** -0.036 -0.037 
  (0.037) (0.041) (0.042) (0.045) (0.035) (0.038) (0.066) (0.059) 
Hubei -0.412*** -0.296*** -0.402*** -0.371*** -0.297*** -0.286*** -0.042 -0.143** 
  (0.034) (0.036) (0.042) (0.046) (0.043) (0.050) (0.068) (0.064) 
Chongqing -0.191*** -0.157*** -0.174*** -0.208*** -0.247*** -0.115*** 0.089 -0.052 
  (0.046) (0.051) (0.052) (0.057) (0.043) (0.043) (0.081) (0.076) 
Sichuan -0.320*** -0.333*** -0.343*** -0.265*** -0.409*** -0.194*** 0.067 -0.065 
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  (0.034) (0.039) (0.045) (0.051) (0.041) (0.039) (0.069) (0.070) 
Yunnan -0.288*** -0.168*** -0.198*** -0.127*** -0.437*** -0.201*** -0.217*** -0.091 
  (0.032) (0.034) (0.041) (0.046) (0.038) (0.042) (0.082) (0.075) 
Gansu -0.474*** -0.450*** -0.385*** -0.460*** -0.501*** -0.413*** -0.178** -0.197** 
  (0.036) (0.044) (0.051) (0.059) (0.038) (0.042) (0.078) (0.094) 
Constant 5.947*** 5.770*** 6.469*** 6.040*** 7.210*** 6.560*** 7.040*** 6.916*** 
  (0.055) (0.058) (0.090) (0.097) (0.118) (0.107) (0.108) (0.087) 
                  
Observations 4,395 4,463 3,851 3,529 4,047 4,014 2,520 2,295 
R-squared 0.192 0.175 0.207 0.235 0.277 0.238 0.214 0.243 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1  
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Table A12.3. Full results of the separate wage equations, with sector/occupation controls 
 
 
 
With sector/occupation controls 
male 95 female 95 male 02 female 02 male 07 female 07 male 13 female 13 
single -0.197*** -0.182** -0.227*** -0.096 -0.294*** -0.150*** -0.205*** -0.135* 
  (0.051) (0.090) (0.057) (0.061) (0.047) (0.053) (0.074) (0.073) 
other marital status -0.209* 0.166** -0.029 -0.064 -0.234*** 0.011 0.026 0.162** 
  (0.112) (0.070) (0.075) (0.074) (0.085) (0.052) (0.079) (0.067) 
1 minor child -0.018 0.007 0.004 -0.045 -0.040* -0.036 0.053 -0.062* 
  (0.022) (0.030) (0.025) (0.033) (0.023) (0.024) (0.042) (0.037) 
2 or more minor children 0.012 -0.025 0.020 -0.126 -0.146 -0.156* -0.018 -0.137* 
  (0.037) (0.057) (0.076) (0.089) (0.091) (0.080) (0.085) (0.082) 
ages 30‒34 0.175*** 0.060 0.047 0.148*** 0.053 0.111** 0.272*** 0.255*** 
  (0.035) (0.038) (0.055) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.061) (0.054) 
ages 35‒39 0.245*** 0.205*** 0.128** 0.243*** 0.108** 0.140*** 0.355*** 0.340*** 
  (0.036) (0.035) (0.054) (0.043) (0.042) (0.041) (0.061) (0.054) 
ages 40-44 0.279*** 0.238*** 0.175*** 0.237*** 0.110*** 0.093** 0.445*** 0.311*** 
  (0.034) (0.036) (0.054) (0.043) (0.040) (0.041) (0.057) (0.054) 
ages 45‒49 0.300*** 0.185*** 0.209*** 0.237*** 0.093** 0.105** 0.379*** 0.318*** 
  (0.035) (0.047) (0.054) (0.050) (0.044) (0.046) (0.062) (0.061) 
minority -0.049 -0.114*** 0.008 0.079 -0.009 -0.028 0.072 -0.011 
  (0.037) (0.042) (0.053) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.077) (0.074) 
middle school 0.116*** 0.082** 0.070 0.141* 0.051 0.072 0.060 0.069 
  (0.041) (0.040) (0.062) (0.084) (0.101) (0.096) (0.092) (0.064) 
high school 0.145*** 0.111*** 0.194*** 0.304*** 0.120 0.198** 0.281*** 0.302*** 
  (0.044) (0.040) (0.062) (0.086) (0.101) (0.094) (0.093) (0.070) 
vocational secondary school 0.217*** 0.202*** 0.267*** 0.434*** 0.217** 0.317*** 0.280*** 0.346*** 
  (0.044) (0.044) (0.066) (0.091) (0.104) (0.098) (0.099) (0.071) 
vocational post-secondary 
school 0.203*** 0.231*** 0.326*** 0.529*** 0.375*** 0.456*** 0.541*** 0.567*** 
  (0.045) (0.045) (0.064) (0.089) (0.101) (0.096) (0.093) (0.072) 
college and higher 0.287*** 0.303*** 0.504*** 0.695*** 0.563*** 0.664*** 0.747*** 0.793*** 
  (0.047) (0.051) (0.068) (0.095) (0.104) (0.099) (0.099) (0.076) 
collective sector -0.207*** -0.261*** -0.239*** -0.254*** -0.275*** -0.172*** -0.211*** -0.271*** 
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.046) (0.035) (0.047) (0.037) (0.070) (0.071) 
private/joint venture/foreign 
owned 0.145 0.119 -0.217*** -0.287*** -0.175*** -0.155*** -0.269*** -0.188*** 
  (0.118) (0.090) (0.040) (0.044) (0.023) (0.025) (0.044) (0.039) 
other ownership -0.120 -0.088 -0.091*** -0.174*** -0.314*** -0.417*** -0.328*** -0.318*** 
  (0.170) (0.107) (0.035) (0.038) (0.057) (0.040) (0.083) (0.060) 
commercial or service worker     -0.199*** -0.221*** -0.082** -0.084** 0.007 0.025 
      (0.052) (0.044) (0.041) (0.042) (0.063) (0.060) 
office worker 0.039 0.088*** 0.043 0.137*** 0.062** 0.115*** 0.088 0.112* 
  (0.026) (0.025) (0.030) (0.034) (0.029) (0.037) (0.054) (0.060) 
official or manager 0.152*** 0.230*** 0.173*** 0.386*** 0.195*** 0.290*** 0.127 0.106 
  (0.027) (0.038) (0.036) (0.058) (0.040) (0.061) (0.088) (0.092) 
professional or technician 0.116*** 0.165*** 0.104*** 0.189*** 0.129*** 0.238*** 0.122** 0.181** 
  (0.026) (0.030) (0.031) (0.037) (0.030) (0.040) (0.056) (0.071) 
agricultural and related         0.022 -0.095 -0.293 -0.201 
          (0.090) (0.111) (0.214) (0.175) 
others -0.001 0.014 -0.220** -0.469*** -0.000 -0.066 -0.193** 0.056 
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  (0.054) (0.046) (0.089) (0.095) (0.053) (0.056) (0.091) (0.075) 
agriculture -0.036 -0.078 0.013 0.083 -0.084 0.115 -0.102 -0.188 
  (0.064) (0.111) (0.066) (0.064) (0.079) (0.103) (0.183) (0.129) 
mining 0.102* 0.141** 0.004 -0.179** 0.350*** 0.182** 0.063 0.011 
  (0.057) (0.056) (0.043) (0.091) (0.066) (0.074) (0.104) (0.198) 
construction 0.095** 0.054 -0.038 -0.041 0.087* -0.136* -0.005 -0.117 
  (0.048) (0.049) (0.056) (0.081) (0.049) (0.082) (0.080) (0.099) 
public utilities 0.031 -0.044 0.062* -0.043 0.157*** 0.171*** -0.114 -0.015 
  (0.060) (0.048) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.048) (0.078) (0.074) 
transportation and 
communication 0.082* 0.021 0.101*** 0.135*** 0.023 0.129*** 0.010 0.078 
  (0.045) (0.043) (0.039) (0.047) (0.032) (0.047) (0.068) (0.077) 
commerce and trade -0.136*** -0.083*** -0.069 -0.016 -0.052 -0.008 -0.185** -0.140** 
  (0.032) (0.028) (0.049) (0.049) (0.040) (0.039) (0.072) (0.056) 
finance and insurance 0.190*** 0.281*** 0.192*** 0.034 -0.093** -0.050 -0.224*** -0.188*** 
  (0.045) (0.065) (0.051) (0.066) (0.040) (0.035) (0.065) (0.055) 
education and culture -0.041 0.020 0.160*** 0.004 0.004 0.066* -0.343*** -0.164** 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.037) (0.043) (0.041) (0.040) (0.086) (0.072) 
health and social welfare 0.007 0.067* 0.150*** 0.169*** 0.198*** 0.140** -0.121 -0.057 
  (0.034) (0.036) (0.045) (0.044) (0.051) (0.062) (0.081) (0.087) 
scientific research and 
technology 0.102*** 0.113*** 0.153* 0.232** 0.114** 0.292*** -0.073 0.056 
  (0.032) (0.039) (0.083) (0.093) (0.053) (0.061) (0.105) (0.100) 
government and social 
organizations -0.039* 0.059** 0.091*** 0.057 0.040 -0.009 -0.201*** -0.187*** 
  (0.023) (0.029) (0.033) (0.044) (0.034) (0.037) (0.066) (0.071) 
Beijing -0.219*** -0.213*** -0.167*** -0.313*** -0.176*** -0.102*** 0.133** 0.133*** 
  (0.038) (0.041) (0.051) (0.053) (0.034) (0.036) (0.059) (0.050) 
Shanxi -0.490*** -0.527*** -0.479*** -0.497*** -0.431*** -0.369*** -0.053 -0.335*** 
  (0.036) (0.040) (0.050) (0.058) (0.034) (0.039) (0.071) (0.072) 
Liaoning -0.391*** -0.367*** -0.242*** -0.264*** -0.431*** -0.432*** -0.067 -0.072 
  (0.037) (0.040) (0.045) (0.048) (0.036) (0.036) (0.087) (0.066) 
Jiangsu -0.174*** -0.064* -0.236*** -0.225*** 0.013 0.049 0.222*** 0.235*** 
  (0.033) (0.037) (0.043) (0.049) (0.043) (0.043) (0.065) (0.052) 
Anhui -0.374*** -0.335*** -0.311*** -0.350*** -0.254*** -0.263*** 0.143** -0.108 
  (0.036) (0.041) (0.045) (0.051) (0.036) (0.038) (0.069) (0.066) 
Henan -0.477*** -0.465*** -0.368*** -0.381*** -0.496*** -0.325*** -0.109* -0.050 
  (0.037) (0.041) (0.042) (0.044) (0.035) (0.036) (0.066) (0.058) 
Hubei -0.415*** -0.307*** -0.415*** -0.374*** -0.320*** -0.283*** -0.152** -0.174*** 
  (0.034) (0.037) (0.042) (0.043) (0.040) (0.045) (0.068) (0.061) 
Chongqing -0.214*** -0.161*** -0.199*** -0.166*** -0.235*** -0.069 0.055 -0.030 
  (0.048) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.043) (0.043) (0.083) (0.079) 
Sichuan -0.321*** -0.315*** -0.341*** -0.184*** -0.419*** -0.227*** 0.031 -0.052 
  (0.036) (0.040) (0.045) (0.049) (0.040) (0.037) (0.071) (0.063) 
Yunnan -0.315*** -0.188*** -0.267*** -0.163*** -0.441*** -0.262*** -0.233*** -0.085 
  (0.033) (0.036) (0.042) (0.044) (0.036) (0.041) (0.080) (0.072) 
Gansu -0.515*** -0.483*** -0.400*** -0.452*** -0.551*** -0.498*** -0.272*** -0.223** 
  (0.038) (0.043) (0.049) (0.057) (0.037) (0.039) (0.080) (0.092) 
Constant 6.017*** 5.890*** 6.624*** 6.265*** 7.373*** 6.869*** 7.427*** 7.202*** 
  (0.058) (0.062) (0.090) (0.098) (0.116) (0.109) (0.118) (0.095) 
                  
Observations 4,111 4,167 3,686 3,378 4,038 3,981 2,435 2,198 
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R-squared 0.238 0.246 0.273 0.337 0.347 0.339 0.256 0.284 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1  
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Table 12.1. Definition of wage earnings before and after 2013 
  
NBS definition 
of wage 
earnings before 
2013  
NBS definition 
of wage 
earnings, 2013  
Adjusted wage 
earnings, 2013 
Wage and salary income (including bonuses 
and allowances) √ √ √ 
In-kind payments from employer × √ × 
Contributions to social insurance deducted by 
employer from employee earnings √ √ √ 
Employer contributions to social insurance × √ √ 
Retirement payments and reimbursed medical 
expenses received by employees of 
administrative organizations that made no 
social insurance contributions (未缴纳任何社
会保险费的行政事业单位人员获得的的离
退休费和报销医疗费) 
× √ √ 
Severance payments × √ × 
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Table 12.2. Employment status of working-age adults, 1995, 2002, 2007, and 2013 (%) 
  
1995 2002 2007 2013 
male female male female male female male female 
Working, total 85.2 75.3 75.9 59.1 80.4 62.3 81.0 62.8 
     of which: wage jobs 83.7 73.7 72.0 56.4 74.4 58.4 72.1 54.9 
     of which: self employed 1.5 1.2 3.9 2.8 6.0 3.9 7.8 5.8 
Unemployed 2.8 2.6 7.2 9.3 4.3 6.4 2.8 3.6 
Retired 3.6 11.4 5.7 16.9 4.3 17.4 3.3 11.3 
Student 7.8 7.5 10.1 9.8 10.3 8.8 9.4 9.3 
Home maker 0.1 2.3 0.2 3.7 0.2 3.7 0.8 8.7 
Other 0.6 0.9 0.9 1.2 0.5 1.3 2.8 4.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sample size (unweighted) 7,440 7,817 7,417 7,755 7,919 8,370 5,741 5,990 
 
Notes:  Working age is 16‒59 years, inclusive.  Calculated using the CHIP urban data, with weights.  The 
sample is restricted to formal urban residents (with an urban hukou) in the twelve common provinces.  
Note that due to missing values and rounding, in some years the percentage with wage jobs plus the 
percentage of self-employed do not equal the total percentage of those working. 
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Table 12.3. Characteristics of the estimation sample by gender, CHIP 2007 and 2013 
  1995 2002 2007 2013 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Sample size (unweighted) 4,588 4,686 3,876 3,549 4,062 4,033 2,773 2,510 
Age group (%)                 
25‒29 11.3 11.6 9.4 10.7 11.5 13.3 15.0 16.3 
30‒34 17.9 19.4 15.8 18.7 14.3 16.8 16.9 18.1 
35‒39 21.5 22.8 21.8 22.3 23.4 24.8 18.6 20.6 
40‒44 27.8 29.0 22.8 24.2 28.9 27.3 24.7 23.9 
45‒49 21.5 17.2 30.2 24.1 21.8 17.9 24.8 21.1 
Ethnicity (%)                 
Han 95.6 95.4 97.3 97.0 97.3 97.1 97.4 97.5 
ethnic minority 4.4 4.6 2.7 3.0 2.7 2.9 2.6 2.5 
Marital status (%)                 
single 5.9 2.9 8.2 5.4 9.5 6.9 9.0 7.8 
married 93.3 95.5 90.8 92.0 89.7 89.8 88.4 88.4 
others 0.8 1.6 1.0 2.6 0.8 3.3 2.6 3.8 
Educational attainment (%)                 
批 primary school and less 5.6 8.8 2.6 2.9 0.9 1.4 2.8 4.3 
middle school 34.0 38.2 24.7 25.7 14.8 15.3 24.3 23.6 
high school 18.8 21.8 26.1 29.2 25.5 29.6 15.8 16.7 
vocational secondary school 
(zhongzhuan, jixiao) 13.6 14.2 8.5 12.5 10.1 11.5 12.7 11.7 
vocational post-secondary school 
(dazhuan) 19.6 12.7 24.2 21.9 27.2 29.1 20.6 22.0 
college and beyond 8.4 4.3 14.0 7.8 21.5 13.1 23.7 21.7 
Number of children under the 
age of 16 in the household (%)                 
0 30.4 32.6 43.9 45.4 45.8 48.8 47.4 50.9 
1 65.7 64.1 53.9 53.2 51.7 48.9 46.9 44.9 
2 or more 3.9 3.3 2.2 1.5 2.5 2.2 5.7 4.2 
Ownership of work unit (%)                 
public unit and SOE 85.0 76.9 69.2 64.3 58.8 50.6 45.0 39.7 
collective sector 12.3 20.3 5.7 10.1 5.5 7.8 4.3 5.0 
private firm, self-employed, and 
joint-venture or foreign firm 2.2 2.0 13.7 11.7 31.4 31.8 44.6 47.5 
other ownership 0.5 0.7 11.4 13.9 4.3 9.7 6.1 7.8 
Occupation (%)                 
manual worker 38.6 40.8 35.3 26.8 23.9 12.7 27.3 15.0 
commercial or service worker     7.9 17.7 10.0 23.5 20.9 33.9 
office worker 20.9 22.7 19.3 25.1 33.1 38.3 19.8 20.2 
manager or official 15.8 5.3 14.1 4.8 7.3 2.5 5.9 4.5 
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professional or technician 21.7 24.3 21.3 23.1 20.9 17.5 19.8 21.8 
agricultural and related         0.6 1.2 0.9 0.7 
other 2.9 6.9 2.1 2.5 4.2 4.3 5.3 3.9 
Sector of employment (%)                 
primary 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.7 1.4 0.9 
secondary 48.5 48.3 35.5 31.6 27.9 19.1 30.8 19.8 
tertiary 49.6 50.3 63.3 67.2 71.1 80.2 67.7 79.3 
 
Notes:   
1.)  Calculated using the CHIP urban data with weights.  The sample is restricted to formal urban 
residents (with an urban hukou) between the ages of 25 and 49 with wage employment in the twelve 
provinces common to all four years of the data. 
2.)  Marital status “other” includes widowers/widows, divorcees, and cohabitation. 
3.)  Primary industry is agriculture; secondary industry is mining, manufacturing, public utilities, and 
construction; and tertiary industry is all other sectors.  These definitions are from the NBS national 
accounts classifications.  See 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/ClassificationsMethods/Definitions/200204/t20020419_72392.html   
Accessed April 28, 2016. 
4.) In the CHIP 1995 survey the questionnaire did not include the occupation categories “commercial or 
service worker” or “agricultural and related.” The reason is that in the 1990s the tertiary sector was quite 
underdeveloped and employment within commercial and service departments was small.  Also, hukou 
restrictions in the 1990s were strict, preventing rural residents from living in the cities. Consequently, 
workers holding “agricultural and related” occupations were basically nonexistent.  
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Table 12.4. The raw gender wage ratio in the overall CHIP estimation sample and by 
subgroup (%) 
  1995 2002 2007 2013 
Overall average 86.7 82.7 70.6 74.2 
Ethnicity         
Han 86.7 82.4 70.5 74.3 
ethnic minority 86.2 92.0 75.7 74.3 
Marital status         
single 95.5 98.3 96.5 100.6 
married 85.7 81.4 68.5 72.0 
others 112.5 96.4 119.4 91.4 
Number of children under the age of 16 in the 
household         
0 88.5 85.6 72.4 77.5 
1 86.3 80.6 69.5 71.9 
2 or more 81.2 73.6 68.2 68.7 
Ownership         
public unit and SOE 89.6 87.6 74.9 78.9 
collective sector 81.5 79.4 76.9 70.9 
private firm, self-employed, and joint-venture or 
foreign firm 93.3 69.7 70.7 72.7 
other ownership 76.6 76.4 65.6 85.2 
Sector         
secondary 84.3 85.3 68.5 71.3 
tertiary 88.7 80.9 70.0 74.8 
Notes:   
1.)  Here and elsewhere, the 2013 CHIP wage data have been adjusted to be consistent with the wage data 
for the earlier years. 
2.)  Calculated using the CHIP urban data, with weights.  Restricted to formal urban residents between the 
ages of 25 and 49 in the twelve common provinces. 
3.)  The primary sector is not shown due to the very small number of observations 
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Table 12.5. Estimated coefficient on the female dummy variable 𝜷𝜷� and the % gender wage gap 
 
  1995 2002 2007 2013 
coefficient, without sector 
and occupation controls -0.132*** -0.200*** -0.319*** -0.270*** 
coefficient, with sector and 
occupation controls -0.106*** -0.162*** -0.252*** -0.213*** 
% wage gap, without sector 
and occupation controls -12.4% -18.1% -27.3% -23.7% 
% wage gap, with sector 
and occupation controls -10.1% -15.0% -22.3% -19.2% 
Notes: 
1.)  Estimates of ?̂?𝛽 from the pooled female and male wage regressions using the CHIP urban data, with 
weights.  The sample is restricted to formal urban residents, between the ages of 25 and 49, with wage 
employment in the twelve common provinces.  These regressions do not include interactions between the 
female dummy variable and the other characteristics.  See the Appendix Tables 12A.1, 12A.2, and 12A.3 
for the full results. 
2.)  Estimates of the % gender wage gap are calculated as p = [exp(?̂?𝛽)/exp(0.5V(?̂?𝛽))]-1, where V(?̂?𝛽) is the 
estimated variance of the coefficient ?̂?𝛽.  See Giles (2011) and Halvorsen and Palmqvist (1980). 
3.)    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1 
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Table 12.6. Estimated coefficients on the sector of the employment dummy variables 
 
1995 2002 2007 2013 
Sector of Ownership (reference category:  state ownership) 
collective sector -0.246*** -0.250*** -0.225*** -0.242*** 
foreign/joint venture/private 0.142* -0.241*** -0.162*** -0.229*** 
other ownership -0.107 -0.134*** -0.399*** -0.335*** 
Sector of Production (reference category: manufacturing) 
1.) agriculture -0.054 0.038 0.016 -0.131 
2.) mining 0.127*** -0.048 0.330*** 0.100 
2.) public utilities -0.014 0.006 0.171*** -0.065 
2.) construction 0.084** -0.024 0.015 -0.008 
3.) transportation and communication 0.060* 0.124*** 0.068*** 0.059 
3.) commerce and trade -0.109*** -0.025 -0.027 -0.149*** 
3.) finance and insurance 0.229*** 0.121*** -0.066** -0.200*** 
3.) education and culture -0.003 0.090*** 0.048* -0.230*** 
3.) health and social welfare 0.038 0.171*** 0.177*** -0.093 
3.) scientific research and technology 0.110*** 0.187*** 0.200*** 0.009 
3.) government and social organizations 0.002 0.068** 0.018 -0.180*** 
Notes: 
1.)  Based on the pooled female and male wage regressions estimated using the CHIP urban data, with 
weights.  The sample is restricted to formal urban residents, between the ages of 25 and 49, with wage 
employment in the twelve common provinces.  These regressions do not include interactions between the 
female dummy variable and other characteristics.  See the Appendix Tables 12A.1, 12A.2, and 12A.3 for 
the full results. 
2.) The numbers before the production sector indicate 1.) primary, 2.) secondary, or 3.) tertiary sectors. 
3.)    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1 
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Table 12.7. Estimated coefficients on the Female dummy variable and its interactions with 
life-event dummy variables 
 without sector controls with sector controls 
1995 2002 2007 2013 1995 2002 2007 2013 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
b0 Female -0.167*** -0.234*** -0.358*** -0.248*** -0.140*** -0.176*** -0.289*** -0.191*** 
b1 Female*single 0.071 0.175*** 0.210*** 0.182** 0.059 0.130* 0.178*** 0.151 
b3 Female*1 minor children 0.047* 0.044 0.036 -0.078* 0.045 0.016 0.036 -0.079* 
b4 Female*2 plus minor 
children -0.030 -0.046 -0.000 -0.114 -0.032 -0.142 0.024 -0.077 
Notes: 
1.)  Based on pooled female and male wage regressions estimated using the CHIP urban data, with 
weights.  The sample is restricted to formal urban residents between the ages of 25 and 49, with wage 
employment in the twelve common provinces.  These regressions are the same as the pooled wage 
regressions reported in the Appendix Tables 12A.1, 12A.2, and 12A.3, except that they include 
interactions between the female dummy variable and marital status and between the female dummy 
variable and the children dummy variables.  
2.) Earnings are the predicted wages by age group, which are calculated using the estimated coefficients 
from the separate female and male wage regressions without sector and occupation controls.  All 
characteristics except education are set at the respective female and male means.  Estimates with 
sector/occupation controls yield similar results.  2007 wages are expressed in 2013 prices based on the 
NBS national urban consumer price index (NBS, various years).  
3.)    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1 
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Table 12.8. Estimated coefficients on marital status and children for women and men, 2007 
and 2013, from separate wage equations for women and men 
  2007 2013 
marriage      
   men 0.318*** 0.253*** 
   women 0.153*** 0.151** 
one child      
   men -0.039 0.062 
   women -0.036 -0.064 
two or more children     
   men -0.146 -0.018 
   women -0.156* -0.137* 
Notes: 
1.)  The coefficients on marriage are a measure of the percentage wage premium relative to being single, 
after controlling for all other characteristics. 
2.)  The coefficients on the children variables are a measure of the wage penalty of having one child age 
16 or less in the household, relative to having no children, or having two or more children age 16 or less 
in the household relative to no children. 
3.)  Estimates are from separate female and male wage regressions, weighted, without controls for 
sector/occupation.  The samples are restricted to formal urban residents between the ages of 25 and 49 in 
the twelve common provinces. 
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Table 12.9. Decomposition of the ln gender wage gap 
  
without ownership, occupation, and 
sector controls 
with ownership, occupation, and 
sector controls 
1995 2002 2007 2013 1995 2002 2007 2013 
Total differential (T = E+C) 15.5 23.9 35.6 28.2 15.2 23.6 35.4 27.0 
Amount attributable to:                 
     endowments (E) 2.0 2.9 3.6 0.9 4.2 5.9 9.4 7.0 
     coefficients + constant term (C) 13.5 21.0 32.0 27.3 11.0 17.7 26.0 20.0 
% of total explained by endowments 
(E/T) 12.9% 12.1% 10.1% 3.2% 27.6% 25.0% 26.6% 25.9% 
% of total unexplained (C/T) 87.1% 87.9% 89.9% 96.8% 72.4% 75.0% 73.4% 74.1% 
Note:  Calculated using the estimates from the separate wage equations for women and men. 
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Note:  Calculated using the CHIP urban data, ages 16‒59, with weights. 
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Figure  12.1. Shares of women and men with wage employment, by 
age (%)
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Notes:    
1.) 2013 wages are adjusted to be consistent with the 2007 NBS income definition of wage earnings. 
2.) Calculated using the CHIP urban data for the twelve provinces common to all four waves of the survey, 
with weights.   
3.) The sample is restricted to individuals with wage employment between the ages of 25 and 49 who are 
formal urban residents (with urban hukou). 
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Notes:  
1.) 2013 wages are adjusted to be consistent with the 2007 NBS income definition of wage earnings. 
2.) Calculated using the CHIP urban data for the twelve provinces common to all four waves of the 
survey, with weights.   
3.) The sample is restricted to individuals with wage employment between the ages of 25 and 49 who are 
formal urban residents (urban hukou). 
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Figure 12.3. Female/male wage ratio, by education (%)
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Notes:  This figure shows the regression-based gender wage ratios within life-event groups, e.g., the ratio 
of the wages of married women with no children to those of married men with no children.  Calculated 
using the Giles (2011) formula for the percentage effects of dummy variables in semi-log regression 
equations, using estimates from pooled wage regressions without sector/occupation controls that include 
the interaction female * life event dummy variables.  The results with sector/occupation controls are 
similar. See Table 12.7.  
single, no
children
married, no
children
married, one
child
married,
more than
one child
1995 91.6 84.6 89.4 81.4
2002 98.0 79.1 83.6 73.9
2007 93.1 69.9 73.5 69.1
2013 97.4 78.0 70.4 66.7
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Figure 12.4. Regression-based gender wage ratios by 
life-event groups (%)
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2007
2013
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Notes:  Earnings are the predicted wages by age group, which are calculated using the estimated 
coefficients from the separate female and male wage regressions without sector and occupation controls.  
All characteristics except age are set at the respective female and male means.  Estimates with 
sector/occupation controls yield similar results.  2007 wages are expressed in 2013 prices based on the 
NBS national urban consumer price index.   
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Figure 12.5. Regression-based age-earnings profiles, 2007 and 
2013 (constant 2013 prices)
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Notes:  Calculated using the predicted wages shown in Figure 12.5.  See the note to Figure 12.5. 
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Figure 12.6. Regression-based gender wage ratio by 
age (%)
2007
2013
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Notes:  Earnings are the predicted wages by age group, which are calculated using the estimated 
coefficients from the separate female and male wage regressions without sector and occupation controls.  
All characteristics except education are set at the respective female and male means.  Estimates with 
sector/occupation controls yield similar results.  2007 wages are expressed in 2013 prices based on the 
NBS national urban consumer price index.   
 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
Figure 12.7. Regression-based education-earnings 
profiles (constant 2013 prices)
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Notes:  Calculated using the predicted wages shown in Figure 12.7.  See the note to Figure 12.7. 
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Figure 12.8. Regression-based gender wage ratio by 
level of education (%)
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